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491_9780530000572
Abstract:The exclusion problem casts doubt on the idea that mental events can have a causal impact on other events in virtue of their mental properties. While many responses to the problem focus on the relationship between mental and physical properties, some analyze other concepts involved, such as the completeness of the physical and overdetermination. However, surprisingly little effort has been made to investigate the exact role causation plays in the problem. An underlying premise of the debate thus seems to be that the problem remains the same regardless of what theory of causation one presupposes. To show that this premise is false, I offer a version of the problem that is more carefully developed than the often sketchy versions discussed in the literature. I then analyze how the problems dynamic and its nature change depending on what theory of causation one presupposes. The results of this analysis can help to explain why and how some of the standard responses are not convincing, at least as responses to my version of the exclusion problem. In some respects, that version is stronger, and, in other respects, it is weaker than versions more commonly discussed. As a result, standard responses may not convince as responses to my version but succeed as responses to other versions. Because of that, I review some of these alternative versions with respect to their virtues and vices and conclude the dissertation by defending my version as the one most suitable for future debate and research.Dissertation Discovery Company and University of Florida are dedicated to making scholarly works more discoverable and accessible throughout the world. This dissertation, Excluding Thoroughly by Andreas Falke, was obtained from University of Florida and is being sold with permission from the author. A digital copy of this work may also be found in the universitys institutional repository, IR@UF. The content of this dissertation has not been altered in any way. We have altere
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