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Unsnarling the World-Knot
Cód:
491_9781556357558
The mind-body problem, which Schopenhauer called the world-knot, has been a central problem for philosophy since the time of Descartes. Among realists--those who accept the reality of the physical world--the two dominant approaches have been dualism and materialism, but there is a growing consensus that, if we are ever to understand how mind and body are related, a radically new approach is required.David Ray Griffin develops a third form of realism, one that resolves the basic problem (common to dualism and materialism) of the continued acceptance of the Cartesian view of matter. In dialogue with various philosophers, including Dennett, Kim, McGinn, Nagel, Seager, Searle, and Strawson, Griffin shows that materialist physicalism is even more problematic than dualism. He proposes instead a panexperientialist physicalism grounded in the process philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Answering those who have rejected panpsychism as obviously absurd, Griffin argues compellingly that panexperientialism, by taking experience and spontaneity as fully natural, can finally provide a naturalistic account of the emergence of consciousness--an account that also does justice to the freedom we all suppose in practice.The panexperientialist approach is an important possible position on the mind-body problem, and Griffin does a great service in accessibly presenting its distinctive slant on that problem. . . . This will remind the mainstream that there are alternatives, radical alternatives, that can present a reasoned case for themselves.--William Seager, author of Metaphysics of ConsciousnessA major philosophical study relating Whiteheads philosophical position to one of the primary unresolved issues at the hear of the analytic agenda, the mind-body problem, this book has the potential to begin serious discourse across philosophical division on a topic central to philosophy.--Donald W. Sherburne, editor of A Key to Whiteheads Process and RealityDavid
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